A Reality Checklist for Multi-Device Systems in the Wild?

This position paper proposes the development of a reality checklist for multi-device systems in the wild. The checklist will help researchers evaluate designs, design ideas or design specifications for a system before it is deployed in the wild

Epistemic Schmagency?

Constructivist approaches in epistemology and ethics offer a promising account of normativity. But constructivism faces a powerful Schmagency Objection, raised by David Enoch. While Enoch’s objection has been widely discussed in the context of practical norms, no one has yet explored how the Schmagency Objection might undermine epistemic constructivism. In this paper, I rectify that gap. First, I develop the objection against a prominent form of epistemic constructivism, Belief Constitutivism. Belief Constitutivism is susceptible to a Schmagency Objection, I argue, because it locates the source of normativity in the belief rather than the agent. In the final section, I propose a version of epistemic constructivism that locates epistemic normativity as constitutive of agency. I argue that this version has the resources to respond to the Schmagency Objection

Social enterprise and disruption innovation: evaluating the role of Rumie's free educational software in seven developing economies

This paper reviews the provision of free educational hardware and software provided by one social enterprise to under resourced children in seven countries. The social and economic challenges faced by this social enterprise are highlighted; the implications for social enterprise of adopting disruptive innovation and of blended learning techniques in an educational context; and the importance of evaluating projects in terms of research methods. Three research questions were posed: what is the educational benefit of using Rumie? [Value dimension]; what criteria can be used to evaluate the use of Rumie in the field? [The capability dimension]; what feedback is there from students, teachers, etc. [The collaboration dimension]. Quantitative usage data and qualitative feedback were collected. Findings show that the tablets help improve pupils math and reading abilities and the educal entertainment does not appear to be at the expense of learning about more traditional subjects. Feedback from teachers and pupils appears to be extremely positive. More specific lessons learned about research methods in evaluating social entrepreneurship projects in developing economies are identified; and implications for adapting the theory of disruptive innovation

Russell on naturalism and practical reason

This response to Paul Russell looks at how we should understand the moral sentiments and their role in action. I think that there is an important tension in Russell’s interpretation of this role. On the one hand, aspects of Russell’s position commit him to some kind of rationalism about the emotions: for instance, he has argued that P. F. Strawson’s account of the reactive is crudely naturalistic; and he has claimed that emotions are constitutive of our sensitivity to moral reasons. On the other hand, he has explicitly endorsed a Humean view of motivation which, I will argue, is incompatible with these rationalist commitments. As well as pointing out the tension and arguing that it should be resolved in the direction of rationalism, I sketch the kind of rationalism that Russell needs: that reason can, through the autonomous progress of moral inquiry, give rise to new forms of emotion

Salmonella Control Programs in Denmark

We describe Salmonella control programs of broiler chickens, layer hens, and pigs in Denmark. Major reductions in the incidence of foodborne human salmonellosis have occurred by integrated control of farms and food processing plants. Disease control has been achieved by monitoring the herds and flocks, eliminating infected animals, and diversifying animals (animals and products are processed differently depending on Salmonella status) and animal food products according to the determined risk. In 2001, the Danish society saved U.S.$25.5 million by controlling Salmonella. The total annual Salmonella control costs in year 2001 were U.S.$14.1 million (U.S.$0.075/kg of pork and U.S.$0.02/kg of broiler or egg). These costs are paid almost exclusively by the industry. The control principles described are applicable to most industrialized countries with modern intensive farming systems

An argument for the use of Aristotelian method in bioethics

The main claim of this paper is that the method outlined and used in Aristotle's Ethics is an appropriate and credible one to use in bioethics. Here “appropriate” means that the method is capable of establishing claims and developing concepts in bioethics and “credible” that the method has some plausibility, it is not open to obvious and immediate objection. It begins by suggesting why this claim matters and then gives a brief outline of Aristotle's method. The main argument is made in three stages. First, it is argued that Aristotelian method is credible because it compares favourably with alternatives. In this section it is shown that Aristotelian method is not vulnerable to criticisms that are made both of methods that give a primary place to moral theory (such as utilitarianism) and those that eschew moral theory (such as casuistry and social science approaches). As such, it compares favourably with these other approaches that are vulnerable to at least some of these criticisms. Second, the appropriateness of Aristotelian method is indicated through outlining how it would deal with a particular case. Finally, it is argued that the success of Aristotle's philosophy is suggestive of both the credibility and appropriateness of his method.</p

Introduction: Examined Live – An Epistemological Exchange Between Philosophy and Cultural Psychology on Reflection

Besides the general agreement about the human capability of reflection, there is a large area of disagreement and debate about the nature and value of “reflective scrutiny” and the role of “second-order states” in everyday life. This problem has been discussed in a vast and heterogeneous literature about topics such as epistemic injustice, epistemic norms, agency, understanding, meta-cognition etc. However, there is not yet any extensive and interdisciplinary work, specifically focused on the topic of the epistemic value of reflection. This volume is one of the first attempts aimed at providing an innovative contribution, an exchange between philosophy, epistemology and psychology about the place and value of reflection in everyday life. Our goal in the next sections is not to offer an exhaustive overview of recent work on epistemic reflection, nor to mimic all of the contributions made by the chapters in this volume. We will try to highlight some topics that have motivated a new resumption of this field and, with that, drawing on chapters from this volume where relevant. Two elements defined the scope and content of this volume, on the one hand, the crucial contribution of Ernest Sosa, whose works provide original and thought-provoking contributions to contemporary epistemology in setting a new direction for old dilemmas about the nature and value of knowledge, giving a central place to reflection. On the other hand, the recent developments of cultural psychology, in the version of the “Aalborg approach”, reconsider the object and scope of psychological sciences, stressing that “[h]uman conduct is purposeful”